张慧等  则利用生肌敛疮白和血竭等中草药用于复发性口腔溃疡治疗， 取得了明显的疗效。在临床中，中药配伍目前已成为治疗口腔溃疡研究的重要热点，虽然各药物的配方不尽相同，但是都具有生肌敛疮、清热解毒等方面的疗效
Switzerland CHF 1.7126%
Denmark DKK 2.0975%
EU 2.133%; France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium
New Zealand 4.355%
Norway, NOK 3.77%
South Africa 9.4%
格力电器自上市以来一直是一家单业务公司，空调业务收入占主营收入达 80% 以上。凭借单业务的支撑，公司二十年间收入从 28 亿成长到 1100 亿，在空调市场市 占率近 40%，稳坐龙头宝座。任凭行业风吹雨打波折起伏，公司经营维持稳健业绩持 续增长。归根到底，凭借的是公司强大的上下游议价能力，产品力及渠道力。
通过对下游经销商先收货款后提货，对上游供应商先拿 原材料后支付货款的方式，格力的报表上有充沛的现金流，表现为无息短期负债。公司 流动负债越高，证明经销商预付款项越高，公司经营情况越好。体现在财务报表上即公 司的资产负债率远高于行业，公司“短期借款+预收账款+应付账款+应付票据”为主的流 动负债/营业收入 2016 年为 55%，历史以来基本高于白电行业平均，反映了公司在产业 链中的优势地位和强大的渠道话语权在整个行业中属于佼佼者。
将格力 2008 年至今的市场份额变化与产品溢价率变化作比较可发现，2008 年至 2017 年 H1，公司相对市场平均溢 价率为 12%，市场份额从 23%提升至 34.6%。短期内，公司相对于市场的溢价率提高 时，市场份额降低，但长期来看，公司在保持溢价率稳定的基础上，仍然取得了市场份 额的稳步提升，体现品牌实力与定价能力。
对消费品来说，产品的质量是产品能否赢得口碑，保持长青的基石。对以单品类专 业化深耕作为主导战略的格力来说，更是如此。而这个品牌之所以能在长期发展当中取 得持续增长，重要的是根植于其基因中对好空调的坚持与追求。这也是我们认为格力是 家好公司的根本原因。历史来看，技术人员出身的朱洪江为格力打下了坚实的技术基础， 经过多年建立起“好空调，格力造”的技术口碑。江山易主后，格力仍然保持了原本的技 术积淀，同时不忘研发上的继续投入。这种固本培元的方式让我们有理由相信，格力的 产品根基不会被轻易动摇。
最开始的家电企业，身上贴的是“加工厂”的标签。90 年代初空调引入国内，市场主 要由日本品牌把持，中国企业在价值链中承担的是加工组装的环节，附加值非常低，基 本上是外资的大型加工场。所幸自 20 世纪初诞生以来，空调制冷循环的原理基本没有 变动，中国企业通过“干中学”的方式，逐渐将价值创造环节中的核心技术拿到手中：格 力拥有了凌达压缩机，美的拥有了美芝压缩机和威灵电机，掌握了竞争当中的关键话语 权和定价权。再加上人力成本优势和本土优势，形成了核心抵御外资的能力，于是国产 替代外资，成为国内的空调霸主。
一则，格力掌握了对空调核心元器件的自主研发生产，且处于国际可比水平。压缩 机产业方面, 从销量上来看，2016 年格力家用压缩机全球销量第一，商用压缩机全球销 量第三。格力自主研发的“三缸双级变容积比压缩机技术”被鉴定为“国际领先”水平；开 发的涡旋压缩机为国内首创,成功打破国外涡旋压缩机技术垄断,性能达到行业领先水 平；攻克了混合式磁悬浮轴承的控制技术、大功率高速电机的控制技术以及实现高速大 功率电机自主研发。此外降噪方面，格力家用空调的噪音最低可以在 40 分贝左右，国 际一流的松下、大金也不过如是。
二则，科研上的持续投入长远来看支撑产品生命力的延续。截至 2016 年，格力是 全球最大的空调研发中心。据公司 2016 年年报披露，目前拥有科研人员 8000 多名,国 家级技术研究中心 2 个,国家级工业设计中心 1 个、省级企业重点实验室 1 个;设有 7 个研究院、52个研究所、632个实验室;累计申请技术专利27000多项,其中发明专利10000 余项，首次超越华为。
平均零售价高出市场 10%，彰显公司强大产品力。根据中怡康的零售价格数据， 2017年1-7月格力平均空调售价4193元，高出市场均价13%，高出美的平均售价14%， 高出海尔平均售价 7%。空调产品上本身几大巨头呈现鼎立之势，格力能在历史上价格 战中傲娇不降价，很重要的一点是对自身产品质量的信心。以产品为根基，向上才有能 力制造消费者忠诚度，打造品牌价值，进而给予经销商更多利润空间。
对于消费品而言，渠道是重中之重的环节。对格力的渠道模式做一梳理，会发现格 力也并未从开始就固守某种模式，而是在与经销商的利益平衡上一直做动态调整，一直 演变至今天。
变交易式关系为合作式关系，股权利益绑定经销商。格力渠道模式的变革中最重要 的一环，即是股权利益绑定经销商，将与经销商传统的交易式关系变为合作式关系。目 前的渠道模式是其独家开创的区域销售公司模式。格力在全国共有 27 个省级区域销售公 司，由重要经销商多方参股。市级经销商参照省级形式成立销售分公司，从省级区域销售公司拿货，再分销到近 3 万家专卖店（末端经销商），这个下分过程中可能还包含了三 级、四级经销商。省级销售公司共同持股京海担保投资公司，京海担保为格力第二大股 东，持有上市公司约 10%的股权，与上市公司利益紧密联结。销售公司在自己区域内可 以充分发挥主观能动性，拥有定价权，活动、推广服务等因地制宜。
自建渠道掌握控制权，不惧家电卖场议价。2004 年，格力与 KA 渠道大玩家国美 经历了一场决裂之战。2004 年初因不满国美成都地区对格力空调的大幅降价促销，格力 决定停止对成都国美的供货。国美方面进行反击，下发“关于清理格力空调库存的紧急 通知”，对各地的格力库存进行大清洗。格力方面就此彻底决裂，将国美清除出自身的销 售体系。关系缓和发生在两年以后，2006 年部分区域的经销商与国美的地方公司共谋利 益展开合作，格力重新入驻国美卖场。实际上在 2004 年之前，格力与苏宁也因价格制 定与利益分配的原因发生了合作破裂。格力与两大家电卖场产生冲突的原因，归根结底 是双方对于渠道控制权的互不相让。格力方面需要在不丧失核心议价地位的情况下，与 经销商形成一个稳固的盈利体系；而苏宁国美则需要通过扩大规模形成强大的议价能力 以获取更多利润。两方都希望将渠道的核心控制权掌握在自己手中，因此在十年前买卖 不成仁义不在，彻底决裂。利益面前双方仍选择再次合作，继 2014 年与国美重修旧好 签订战略合作协议之后，2016 年与苏宁全面合作，进店数超过 740 家。格力在历史上 通过自建渠道十几年来在维持溢价能力的基础上依然实现了份额的提升，坐稳空调一哥 位臵，证明了自身渠道模式的稳固性及有效性。而近两年与卖场共谋利益再次合作，保 有渠道控制权的基础上拓宽渠道种类，是为多赢。
格力就估值水平而言，纵向看处于合理区间，横向看处于被低估状态。从目前格力 的估值情况来看，截止 2017 年 9 月 8 日，PE（TTM）12.1 倍，以 2017 年 35%的业 绩增速计算，对应 17 年预测 PE 不到 11 倍。纵向来看公司的估值变化， 2010 年至今 公司 PE（TTM）估值基本处于 10-16 倍的估值波动区间内，目前估值纵向来看位于合 理区间。从 2010 年至 2014 年其估值处于下降通道中，2014 年底-2015 年中的牛市中 出现一个小峰值，之后 2015 年四季度至今，公司估值水平处于缓慢抬升状态。横向对 比行业估值，相比于白电 18 倍的 PE（TTM）估值，格力作为行业龙头的折价率在 0.6， 对比国外家电龙头公司，日本家电龙头大金工业目前 PE（TTM）25 倍，美国家电龙头 惠而浦目前 PE（TTM）16 倍，格力相较于海外龙头，估值也是折价状态。
根据日本统计局的数据，从 1979 年到 2014 年，日本国民可支配收入从 157 万亿 到 291 万亿增长了一倍，空调百户保有量从 64.3 台上升至 272.3 台翻了 4 倍有余。
2016 年中国城镇百户保有量为 123.7 台，对标 1989 年,日本百户保有量为 113 台，未来 5 年 中国可支配收入的增速如果按照过去三年的平均速率则在 7%左右,日本这一时期的可支 配收入增长率则仅有 3.4%。因此我们假设中国城镇保有量提升的速度略高于日本这段时 期的保有量提升速度，则未来 5 年空调保有量提升速率为城镇每年 11 台/百户，2021 年 中国城镇空调百户保有量约为 178.7 台。同理以中国农村对标城镇，2016 年农村百户保 有量为 47.6 台，与 2002 年的城镇水平相近，人均收入增速略低于城镇。5 年间城镇平 均每年保有量提升 8.8 台/百户，农村在提升速率为 8 台/百户的情况下 2021 年百户保有量达到 92 台。
我们假设空调的更新周期为 10 年，当年购买的空调 10 年后自然到期更换，则 2017 年更新需求基本等于 2007 年的内销销量。2017 年更新需求约为 3193 万台，2017 年 -2021 年总更新需求为 21135 万台。
根据 2016 年城镇人口 57%的比重，我们按照总保有量=全国总户数*（城镇比例* 城镇保有率+农村比例*农村保有率）的计算方法得到 2016 年全国空调总保有量。假设 2016 年全国总户数按照过去十年的平均速率增长，则计算得出目前全国空调总保有量约 为 4 亿台。
预计 2017 年总需求 7938 万台，到 2021 年增加至 11252 万台，年均复合 增速约 13.22%。扣除 17 年空调大年的影响，18-21 年平均复合增速为 9.1%。总需求 由新增需求与更新需求组成，更新需求占总需求的比例目前小于新增需求，但从趋势来 看，更新需求增量大于新增需求，其占比将逐渐提升，超过新增需求。
截止 2016 年，全球空调市场规模近千亿美元，其中分体机占比约 80%。根据 BSRIA 的全球空调市场研究，2016 年全球空调市场规模约 926 亿美元。BSRIA 的分类将空调 类型广义地定义为单元式空调和大型商用中央空调，其中单元式空调包括窗机、可移动 式空调、分体机、冷风柜机、屋顶机，主要应用于家装与小型项目中，全球销量约 1.3 亿台，规模为 781 亿美元；大型商用中央空调包括冷水机组、空气处理机组和风机盘管， 2016 年全球销售规模约为 145 亿美元。
中国 2016 年家用空调销售规模占全球比例超七成，在单元式空调领域独占鳌头。 据产业在线数据，中国家用空调生产规模占全球市场的 74%，结合产业在线的家用空调 销量与中怡康的零售均价，粗略估算 2016 年中国家用空调销售规模约 590 亿美元，占 全球单元式空调市场的 76%。也就是说在单元式空调领域，几乎有 8 成产能和销量都源 于中国。
东南亚地区主要国家目前的空调需求与人口规模并不匹配。举例来说，2016 年印度人口规模为 13.2 亿，约为中国人口的 96%，但空调总需求仅为中国的 11%。印 度尼西亚人口规模为我国的 19%，但空调需求仅为我国的 6%。与我国人均 GDP 相比， 东南亚大多数国家仍面临着较大差距，印度人均 GDP 仅为我国的 20.8%，印度尼西亚 则为 43.5%。
根据产业在线的数据，2016 年家用空调市场内销量 6049 万台，按照中怡康零 售数据 2016 年 3700 元的均价推算，整个家用空调市场规模约 2200 亿；根据暖通家的 数据，2016 年整个中央空调行业市场规模达 700 亿，整体增速 8.0%。家用中央空调规 模约 270 亿，增速高达 34.2%，占家用空调与中央空调的比例皆攀升迅速。
按照应用场景，中央空调可以大致分为商用与家用两种。按照暖通家的数据，2016 年商用市场规模约 460 亿，占整个中央空调市场的 62.7%。
传统商用市场多指的是大型水机组为主要输送介质的市场，这部分市场目前被外资 品牌牢牢把持，以欧美系四大家族江森自控约克、开利、特灵、和麦克维尔为首。以水 机中代表最高技术领域的离心机为例，江森自控约克以 25.4%的市场占有率稳居离心机 市场头把交椅，四大家族占据的 CR4 为 69%。水机中的另一代表水冷螺杆机情况类似， 市占率前四依然为欧美系四大家族，CR4为 40.6%。格力所占市场份额分别为 5%和4%。
氟机也为商用中央空调市场作出了一定贡献。风管单元机商用部分贡献了 39 亿的 市场，多联机则贡献了 160 亿的市场，分别占商用部分总市场规模的 8%与 35%。
整体而言，以格力为首的民族品牌在商用中央空调市场水机组的竞争力依然较弱， 目前商用部分的市场大部分依赖于氟机中多联机市场的拓展。但就公司而言,仍然在持续 进行商用市场的研发投入。根据公司公告信息，2016 年，公司自主研发的“高效永磁同 步变频离心式冰蓄冷双工况机组”经广东省科技厅鉴定为国际领先水平，“环境温度-40℃ 工况下制冷技术”被鉴定为国际领先水平。
同样中等配臵的情况下，两居 室的中央空调与分体空调价差约为 0.5 万，这对普通一线城市家庭而言是完全可以无压 力负担的数字；四居室的价差与两居室持平，说明住宅面积越大，购买中央空调性价比 也就越高。
所幸自 20 世纪初诞生以来，空调制冷循环的原理基本没有 变动，中国企业通过“干中学”的方式，逐渐将价值创造环节中的核心技术拿到手中：格 力拥有了凌达压缩机，美的拥有了美芝压缩机和威灵电机，掌握了竞争当中的关键话语 权和定价权。再加上人力成本优势和本土优势，形成了核心抵御外资的能力，于是国产 替代外资，成为国内的空调霸主。
In this letter we will also review some of the basics of our business, hoping to provide both a freshman orientation session for our BNSF newcomers and a refresher course for Berkshire veterans.
From the start, Charlie and I have believed in having a rational and unbending standard for measuring what we have – or have not – accomplished. That keeps us from the temptation of seeing where the arrow of performance lands and then painting the bull’s eye around it.
Selecting the S&P 500 as our bogey was an easy choice because our shareholders, at virtually no cost, can match its performance by holding an index fund. Why should they pay us for merely duplicating that result?
But year-to-year market prices can be extraordinarily erratic.
We should note that had we instead chosen market prices as our yardstick, Berkshire’s results would look better, showing a gain since the start of fiscal 1965 of 22% compounded annually. Surprisingly, this modest difference in annual compounding rate leads to an 801,516% market-value gain for the entire 45-year period compared to the book-value gain of 434,057%
But huge sums forge their own anchor and our future advantage, if any, will be a small fraction of our historical edge.
What We Don’t Do
Long ago, Charlie laid out his strongest ambition: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” That bit of wisdom was inspired by Jacobi, the great Prussian mathematician, who counseled “Invert, always invert” as an aid to solving difficult problems. (I can report as well that this inversion approach works on a less lofty level: Sing a country song in reverse, and you will quickly recover your car, house and wife.)
Here are a few examples of how we apply Charlie’s thinking at Berkshire:
• Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter how exciting their products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to foresee the fabulous growth that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and television sets (in 1950). But the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate almost all of the companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away bleeding.
Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.
• We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. Too-big-to-fail is not a fallback position at Berkshire. Instead, we will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash we may conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity. Moreover, that liquidity will be constantly refreshed by a gusher of earnings from our many and diverse businesses.
When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured $15.5 billion into a business world that could otherwise look only to the federal government for help. Of that, $9 billion went to bolster capital at three highly-regarded and previously-secure American businesses that needed – without delay – our tangible vote of confidence. The remaining $6.5 billion satisfied our commitment to help fund the purchase of Wrigley, a deal that was completed without pause while, elsewhere, panic reigned.
We pay a steep price to maintain our premier financial strength. The $20 billion-plus of cash-equivalent assets that we customarily hold is earning a pittance at present. But we sleep well.
We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on their own, without our supervising and monitoring them to any degree. That means we are sometimes late in spotting management problems and that both operating and capital decisions are occasionally made with which Charlie and I would have disagreed had we been consulted. Most of our managers, however, use the independence we grant them magnificently, rewarding our confidence by maintaining an owner-oriented attitude that is invaluable and too seldom found in huge organizations. We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too slowly – or not at all – because of a stifling bureaucracy.
With our acquisition of BNSF, we now have about 257,000 employees and literally hundreds of different operating units. We hope to have many more of each. But we will never allow Berkshire to become some monolith that is overrun with committees, budget presentations and multiple layers of management. Instead, we plan to operate as a collection of separately-managed medium-sized and large businesses, most of whose decision-making occurs at the operating level. Charlie and I will limit ourselves to allocating capital, controlling enterprise risk, choosing managers and setting their compensation.
We make no attempt to woo Wall Street. Investors who buy and sell based upon media or analyst commentary are not for us. Instead we want partners who join us at Berkshire because they wish to make a long-term investment in a business they themselves understand and because it’s one that follows policies with which they concur. If Charlie and I were to go into a small venture with a few partners, we would seek individuals in sync with us, knowing that common goals and a shared destiny make for a happy business “marriage” between owners and managers. Scaling up to giant size doesn’t change that truth.
Let’s move to the specifics of Berkshire’s operations. We have four major operating sectors, each differing from the others in balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is standard in financial statements, impedes analysis.
In my perhaps biased view, Berkshire has the best large insurance operation in the world. …Outstanding economics exist at Berkshire only because we have some outstanding managers running some unusual businesses.
Since Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its market share has increased from 2.5% to 8.1%, a gain reflecting the net addition of seven million policyholders. Perhaps they contacted us because they thought our gecko was cute, but they bought from us to save important money. And they’ve stayed with us because they like our service as well as our price.
Our third insurance powerhouse is General Re. Some years back this operation was troubled; now it is a gleaming jewel in our insurance crown.
I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.
I was just older.
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America.
so it is incumbent on us to be far-sighted.
We shouldn’t expect our regulators to live up to their end of the bargain unless we live up to ours.
Dave and Greg make sure we do just that. National research companies consistently rank our Iowa and Western utilities at or near the top of their industry.
Indeed, the best businesses by far for owners continue to be those that have high returns on capital and that require little incremental investment to grow.
If either side shirks its obligations, both sides will inevitably suffer.
Though the company’s sales were down 27%, Frank’s cost-conscious management mitigated the decline in earnings.
Every business we own that is connected to residential and commercial construction suffered severely in 2009. Combined pre-tax earnings of Shaw, Johns Manville, Acme Brick, and MiTek were $227 million, an 82.5% decline from $1.295 billion in 2006, when construction activity was booming. These businesses continue to bump along the bottom, though their competitive positions remain undented.
Most important, none of the changes wrought by Dave have in any way undercut the top-of-the-line standards for safety and service that Rich Santulli, NetJets’ previous CEO and the father of the fractional-ownership industry, insisted upon.
Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer of modular and manufactured homes.
Clayton was not always number one: A decade ago the three leading manufacturers were Fleetwood, Champion and Oakwood, which together accounted for 44% of the output of the industry. All have since gone bankrupt. Total industry output, meanwhile, has fallen from 382,000 units in 1999 to 60,000 units in 2009.
The industry is in shambles for two reasons, the first of which must be lived with if the U.S. economy is to recover. This reason concerns U.S. housing starts (including apartment units). In 2009, starts were 554,000, by far the lowest number in the 50 years for which we have data. Paradoxically, this is good news.
People thought it was good news a few years back when housing starts – the supply side of the picture – were running about two million annually. But household formations – the demand side – only amounted to about 1.2 million. After a few years of such imbalances, the country unsurprisingly ended up with far too many houses.
There were three ways to cure this overhang: (1) blow up a lot of houses, a tactic similar to the destruction of autos that occurred with the “cash-for-clunkers” program; (2) speed up household formations by, say, encouraging teenagers to cohabitate, a program not likely to suffer from a lack of volunteers or; (3) reduce new housing starts to a number far below the rate of household formations.
Our country has wisely selected the third option, which means that within a year or so residential housing problems should largely be behind us, the exceptions being only high-value houses and those in certain localities where overbuilding was particularly egregious. Prices will remain far below “bubble” levels, of course, but for every seller (or lender) hurt by this there will be a buyer who benefits. Indeed, many families that couldn’t afford to buy an appropriate home a few years ago now find it well within their means because the bubble burst.
The second reason that manufactured housing is troubled is specific to the industry: the punitive differential in mortgage rates between factory-built homes and site-built homes. Before you read further, let me underscore the obvious: Berkshire has a dog in this fight, and you should therefore assess the commentary that follows with special care. That warning made, however, let me explain why the rate differential causes problems for both large numbers of lower-income Americans and Clayton.
The residential mortgage market is shaped by government rules that are expressed by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Their lending standards are all-powerful because the mortgages they insure can typically be securitized and turned into what, in effect, is an obligation of the U.S. government. Currently buyers of conventional site-built homes who qualify for these guarantees can obtain a 30-year loan at about 5 1⁄4%. In addition, these are mortgages that have recently been purchased in massive amounts by the Federal Reserve, an action that also helped to keep rates at bargain-basement levels.
In contrast, very few factory-built homes qualify for agency-insured mortgages. Therefore, a meritorious buyer of a factory-built home must pay about 9% on his loan. For the all-cash buyer, Clayton’s homes offer terrific value. If the buyer needs mortgage financing, however – and, of course, most buyers do – the difference in financing costs too often negates the attractive price of a factory-built home.
Last year I told you why our buyers – generally people with low incomes – performed so well as credit risks. Their attitude was all-important: They signed up to live in the home, not resell or refinance it. Consequently, our buyers usually took out loans with payments geared to their verified incomes (we weren’t making “liar’s loans”) and looked forward to the day they could burn their mortgage. If they lost their jobs, had health problems or got divorced, we could of course expect defaults. But they seldom walked away simply because house values had fallen. Even today, though job-loss troubles have grown, Clayton’s delinquencies and defaults remain reasonable and will not cause us significant problems.
We have tried to qualify more of our customers’ loans for treatment similar to those available on the site-built product. So far we have had only token success. Many families with modest incomes but responsible habits have therefore had to forego home ownership simply because the financing differential attached to the factory-built product makes monthly payments too expensive. If qualifications aren’t broadened, so as to open low-cost financing to all who meet down-payment and income standards, the manufactured-home industry seems destined to struggle and dwindle.
We told you last year that very unusual conditions then existed in the corporate and municipal bond markets and that these securities were ridiculously cheap relative to U.S. Treasuries. We backed this view with some purchases, but I should have done far more. Big opportunities come infrequently. When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.
The dangers that derivatives pose for both participants and society – dangers of which we’ve long warned, and that can be dynamite – arise when these contracts lead to leverage and/or counterparty risk that is extreme. At Berkshire nothing like that has occurred – nor will it.
It’s my job to keep Berkshire far away from such problems. Charlie and I believe that a CEO must not delegate risk control. It’s simply too important. At Berkshire, I both initiate and monitor every derivatives contract on our books, with the exception of operations-related contracts at a few of our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the minor runoff contracts at General Re. If Berkshire ever gets in trouble, it will be my fault. It will not be because of misjudgments made by a Risk Committee or Chief Risk Officer.
In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it – with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees – the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.
It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country’s largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascos of the last two years. To say these owners have been “bailed-out” is to
The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style. It is the behavior of these CEOs and directors that needs to be changed: If their institutions and the country are harmed by their recklessness, they should pay a heavy price – one not reimbursable by the companies they’ve damaged nor by insurance. CEOs and, in many cases, directors have long benefitted from oversized financial carrots; some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture as well.
Charlie and I enjoy issuing Berkshire stock about as much as we relish prepping for a colonoscopy.
Not everyone at A, it should be noted, is a loser from this nonsensical transaction. Its CEO now runs a company twice as large as his original domain, in a world where size tends to correlate with both prestige and compensation.
If an acquirer’s stock is overvalued, it’s a different story: Using it as a currency works to the acquirer’s advantage. That’s why bubbles in various areas of the stock market have invariably led to serial issuances of stock by sly promoters. [having or showing a cunning or deceitful nature] Going by the market value of their stock, they can afford to overpay because they are, in effect, using counterfeit money. Periodically, many air-for-assets acquisitions have taken place, the late 1960s having been a particularly obscene period for such chicanery. Indeed, certain large companies were built in this way. (No one involved, of course, ever publicly acknowledges the reality of what is going on, though there is plenty of private snickering.
I can’t resist telling you a true story from long ago. We owned stock in a large well-run bank that for decades had been statutorily prevented from acquisitions. Eventually, the law was changed and our bank immediately began looking for possible purchases. Its managers – fine people and able bankers – not unexpectedly began to behave like teenage boys who had just discovered girls.
They soon focused on a much smaller bank, also well-run and having similar financial characteristics in such areas as return on equity, interest margin, loan quality, etc. Our bank sold at a modest price (that’s why we had bought into it), hovering near book value and possessing a very low price/earnings ratio. Alongside, though, the small-bank owner was being wooed by other large banks in the state and was holding out for a price close to three times book value. Moreover, he wanted stock, not cash.
Naturally, our fellows caved in and agreed to this value-destroying deal. “We need to show that we are in the hunt. Besides, it’s only a small deal,” they said, as if only major harm to shareholders would have been a legitimate reason for holding back. Charlie’s reaction at the time: “Are we supposed to applaud because the dog that fouls our lawn is a Chihuahua rather than a Saint Bernard?”
The seller of the smaller bank – no fool – then delivered one final demand in his negotiations. “After the merger,” he in effect said, perhaps using words that were phrased more diplomatically than these, “I’m going to be a large shareholder of your bank, and it will represent a huge portion of my net worth. You have to promise me, therefore, that you’ll never again do a deal this dumb.”
Yes, the merger went through. The owner of the small bank became richer, we became poorer, and the managers of the big bank – newly bigger – lived happily ever after.
At 86 and 79, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Indeed, over the years, our work has become ever more fascinating; no wonder we tap-dance to work. If pushed, we would gladly pay substantial sums to have our jobs (but don’t tell the Comp Committee).
Nothing, however, is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 1st at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
|[ 嘌呤，脂肪] – 高✘ 中□ 低✔|
|适量||虾龙虾鳗鱼蟹三文鱼牡蛎[□, ✔]、坚果 [✔,□] 、 花生酱[✔, ✔ ] 面包[□,□] 、燕麦[□, ✔] 、酸奶 [✔,□]、豆类[□, ✔] 、南瓜 [ ✔ , ✔] 、 南瓜子 [□,□] 、mozzarella奶酪[✔,□]、咖啡[✔,□] 、蜂蜜 [□,□] 、黑巧克力 [✔,□] 、紫菜笋花菜spinach蘑菇茄子 [✘,✔] 球菜、猪肉（无肥肉）|
|少吃|| 动物内脏 [✘ ✘] 、浓肉汁、凤尾鱼、沙丁鱼 [✘✔ ] 、酒、牛肉、糖类[✔,□]、 anchovies鳀, codfish鳕鱼, haddock, herring鲱, mackerel鲭鱼, mussels蚌, roe (fish eggs)鱼子, sardines沙丁鱼, scallops扇贝, and trout鲑鱼. |
肌酸酐（英语：Creatinine）又称肌酐，是肌酸和磷酸肌酸代谢的终产物，它主要由肌肉中磷酸肌酸的非酶促反应生成。对正常成人来说，每日产生肌酸酐的量是恒定的，而且肌酸酐的产生量与肌肉量成正比，因此一般男性的数值比女性高一点。经常锻炼肌肉者和非素食者的数值也较高。肌酸酐的产生量一定，且仅有微量的肌酸酐会被肾小管再吸收。它的排泄量反映血液中的肌酸酐含量和肾小球的过滤速率，也就是肾脏的机能。当肾发生严重病变时，肌酸酐排泄受阻，血液中肌酸酐含量升高。血液中肌酸酐的测定，可以知道肾功能是否有严重障碍，肌酸酐的值越高，肾脏的障碍越大；但是血液肌酸酐只有在肾脏有严重障碍时才会大幅提高，不能作为早期肾脏病的指标。一般正常值为：男性 0.7～1.2 mg/dL（60～110 μmol/L），女性 0.5～1.0 mg/dL（45～90 μmol/L）
Most of the time, a high uric acid level occurs when your kidneys don’t eliminate uric acidefficiently. A uric acid blood test, also known as a serum uric acid measurement, determines how much uric acid is present in your blood. The test can help determine how well your body produces and removes uric acid. Uric acid is a chemical produced when your body breaks down foods that contain organic compounds called purines.
Purine-rich foods include some types of meat, seafood, and vegetables. All of these foods give off uric acid when they’re digested.
Avoid or reduce your intake of foods such as:
- organ meats
- fish and shellfish
- green peas
- dried beans
Foods that are high in purine include:
- All organ meats (such as liver), meat extracts and gravy
- Yeasts, and yeast extracts (such as beer, and alcoholic beverages)
- Asparagus, spinach, beans, peas, lentils, oatmeal, cauliflower and mushrooms
Foods that are low in purine include:
- Refined cereals – breads, pasta, flour, tapioca, cakes
- Milk and milk products, eggs
- Lettuce, tomatoes, green vegetables
- Cream soups without meat stock
- Water, fruit juice, carbonated drinks
- Peanut butter, fruits and nuts
- Keep well hydrated, drinking 2 to 3 liters of water per day, unless you were told otherwise.
- Take all of your medications for hyperuricemia as directed
- Avoid caffeine and alcohol, as these can contribute to problems with uric acid and hyperuricemia.
- Avoid medications, such as thiazide diuretics (hydrochlortiazide), and loop diuretics (such as furosemide or Lasix®). Also, drugs such as niacin, and low doses of aspirin (less than 3 grams per day) can aggravate uric acid levels. Do not take these medications, or aspirin unless a healthcare provider who knows your condition told you.
中国家具行业经过三十多年的发展，已经形成了一定的产业规模，培育了较成熟的家具配套 产业，出现了一些具有国际先进水平的家具明星企业。2011-2015年，中国家具业平均增速为15.84%， 家具行业平均主营业务利润率为6.18%，利润总额平均增速为18.43%。
根据米兰(意大利)国际工业研究中心(CSIL)统计，2016年我国家具制造行业主营业务收 入8559.5亿元，同比增长9%，产量共计79464.15万件，同比增长3.3%。同时根据国家统计局数据， 2011年到2016年我国家具制造业主营业务收入年复合增长率约为11.4%，利润总额年复合增长率达 13.2%。我国家具行业已经进入成熟发展阶段，行业竞争激烈，整体需求较为稳定，未来几年家具 行业呈现稳定增长态势。
(3)整体家居行业消费升级，销售渠道下沉明显；随着城市化的深入以及80、90后成为社会主体，整体家居消费升级趋势明显。以橱柜为例， 根据中华厨柜网的数据，26-45岁人群为厨柜消费主体，占比达到81%。在地域方面，橱柜销售渠 道下沉明显，中华橱柜网数据显示，2016年二三线城市购买整体橱柜占比达到61%，较2015年提高 6个百分点
公司主要营业收入来自整体橱柜和整体衣柜。随着消费升级和城市化进程的加快，高品质整 体橱柜市场需求也逐渐增长。但是从行业集中度从看，目前龙头份额依然较低，排名前7位的企业， 如按照销量口径计算，其市场占有率合计仅7%;如按主营业务收入口径计算，其市场占有率合计 仅22.1%，龙头企业未来还有较大的提升空间。
从2016年开始浙江、上海、 江苏等地颁布政令，在2020至2025年前“毛坯房”将逐步退出房地产市场，新建住宅实现100%“全 装修和成品交付”。作为地产后周期行业，家具行业与地产之间的相关性逐渐减弱，二手房和翻新房正在替代新房成为家具行业市场需求的主要来源。
欧派家居集团于2017年3月16日向社会公众投资者定价发行人民币普通股(A 股)4151 万股，每股面值人民币 1.00 元，每股发行认购价格为人民币 50.08 元，募集资金总额为 207,882.08 万元，扣除承销费用人民币 7,300.00 万元(保荐费用、律师费用、审计费用等发行 费用尚未扣除)，实际到账募集资金为 200,582.08 万元。
经销商专卖店和公司 直营店构成的销售网络已拥有门店超过 6000 家、超过 4 万名的专业设计人员和服务人员。
大批量采用以不含甲 醛的 MDI 生态胶生产的人造板来提升产品环保要求，引入处于行业前端的激光封边技术，实现板 材与封边带无缝黏合;公司产品的关键五金大批量从奥地利百隆和德国海蒂诗采购，另外与德国 ZIMMER 公司共同研发了一款滑动顺畅、推拉省力的新型上下同步阻尼移门滑轮，该项技术目前 处于行业领先水平。现拥有清远、天津、无锡、成都(建设中)四大生产基地，形成辐射华南、 华北、华东、华西的全国性生产能力，生产规模雄踞亚洲。
預期截至二零一八年十二月三十一日止年度本公司擁 有人應佔淨利潤較截至二零一七年十二月三十一日止年度同期下跌約 30% 左右。該 減少主要由於(1)截至二零一八年十二月三十一日止年度的原材料成本較截至二零 一七年十二月三十一日止年度上升;(2)截至二零一八年十二月三十一日止年度的 門店經營利潤率較截至二零一七年十二月三十一日止年度下跌;及(3)自二零一八 年四月起河北周黑鴨食品工業園有限公司投產的折舊及能耗成本的上升等。
David Webb quit his job at 33, got rich investing in Hong Kong。Now 53 and comfortably rich, he’s OK with giving away his research。his total wealth — have swelled to about $170 million from $30 million in 2003
Over the past 20 months, he has advised readers of his widely followed website to avoid more than 75 of the city’s publicly traded companies — several of which subsequently became targets of the largest-ever raid by Hong Kong’s securities regulator. Stocks on his “not to own’’ lists have lost $16 billion of their value since he warned against buying them.
Here’s how Webb describes the basics of his investment strategy:
- Owns about 35 stocks at a time, with an average holding period of “five-plus’’ years
- Long only, never short
- Prefers large stakes in small companies and isn’t afraid to take an activist role: “If you are going to be a minority shareholder, it’s better to be a big one’’
- Doesn’t use leverage
- Looks for businesses that are well-governed and undervalued
- Reads the regulatory filings –- almost all of them
- Avoids large caps
- Refuses to manage outside money: “It’s a lot of hassle’’
手机屏对于分众而言，即可能是竞争对手，也可能是合作伙伴。分众正通过技术升级，与手机屏在楼宇电视覆盖范围产生互动，更好地利用红包、折扣券等多种形式提升楼宇电视的广告价值——这种具有 Wi-Fi、 iBeacon、人脸识别和 ApplePay 功能的新一代电梯电视互动大屏在2016年底研制成功。
2017 年，公司在一线城市已基本完成更换。 2018 年，公司正陆续在二三线城市更新换代，顺带将以前 40×50cm的电梯海报也更新为 60×80cm的大版。
|3/11/2018||CMC Sapiens A$||CMC CX A$||A Share ￥||others ￥||Amount-￥/$||%|
|Hong Kong 50||23,000||114,080||1.06%|
|Hong Kong ChinaH||79,300||393,328||3.67%|